Products Liability--An Analysis of the Law Concerning Design and Warning Defects in Workplace Products by Carpenter, Charles E., Jr.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 33 Issue 2 Article 6 
12-1981 
Products Liability--An Analysis of the Law Concerning Design and 
Warning Defects in Workplace Products 
Charles E. Carpenter Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles E. Jr. Carpenter, Products Liability--An Analysis of the Law Concerning Design and Warning 
Defects in Workplace Products, 33 S. C. L. Rev. 273 (1981). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-AN ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW CONCERNING DESIGN
AND WARNING DEFECTS IN
WORKPLACE PRODUCTS
CHARLES E. CARPENTER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Product defects can generally be divided into two types: de-
fective manufacture or assembly resulting in a physical flaw in
an individual product; and defective design or warnings where
the entire product line is inadequate and there need be no
physical flaw. The fact that the entire product line is at risk is
an important distinction, because of the larger scope of potential
risk and the larger scope of potential liability when compared
with a case of mismanufacture affecting only a single unit or
group. The fact that no physical flaw is necessary is also impor-
tant, because it makes it easier to allege a cause of action when
an injured party cannot point to a demonstrated manufacturing
defect that is associated with the injury.
Product-related accidents can also be divided into work-
place accidents and consumer accidents. Work-related injuries
represent a substantial portion of all products liability litigation.
According to the Interagency Task Force on Products Liability,
during the years 1965-70, forty-six percent of the products cases
surveyed were work-related; and the figure increased to fifty per-
cent during the years 1971-76.1 An Insurance Services Office sur-
vey of more than 24,000 products liability claims closed between
July 1, 1976 and March 15, 1977 found that workplace injuries
resulted in average claims payments much higher than the com-
* Member, South Carolina, Virginia, and District of Columbia Bars. B.A. 1966,
Furman University; J.D. 1969, University of Virginia; M.P.A. 1976, University of South
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1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LmiLsrr. FINAL
REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY Vol. HI, at 78 (1977).
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bined average of claims payments for workplace injuries and
consumer injuries.2
Workplace accidents have unique features when compared
with consumer accidents. In a workplace accident, the pur-
chaser-employer is often knowledgeable, frequently alters the
product, and almost always controls the environment in which
the product is used. When an employee is injured on the job, the
employer must pay compensation benefits without regard to
fault.3 These benefits generally include medical expenses4 and
some fraction of the employee's weekly wage for a defined period
of time. If the injury to the employee is the result of some ac-
tionable conduct by a third party, a suit may be brought in the
name of the employee, 5 and the employer is ordinarily reim-
bursed out of any proceeds.6 Even if the primary responsibility
for the injury rests with the employer, the employee's opportu-
nity for recovery from the employer is usually restricted to
workmen's compensation benefits.7 Because the amount of work-
men's compensation benefits is limited, the employee may feel
2. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCTS LrABLrry CLOSE CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS-HIGHLIGHTS 1 (1977), cited by Weisgall, Products Li-
ability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Lia-
bilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 1035, 1038-39 n. 13. The Interagency Task
Force used "work-related" injuries as the basis for its report. The Insurance Services
Office, on the other hand, based its survey on "workplace injuries." Accordingly, the In-
surance Services Office Survey "found that, although workplace injuries account for only
eleven (11%) percent of the products liability accidents which result in claims payments,
these incidents account for forty-two (42%) percent of total bodily injuries payments,
with an average claim of $97,884." Although the precise definition of the terms "work-
related" and "workplace" are not clear, under either criterion work-related injuries re-
present a substantial portion of all products liability litigation.
3. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-10, -20 (Supp. 1980). But see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-
70 (1976)(allowing a ten percent increase in compensation when the injury or death is
due to the fault of the employer), -50 (1976)(allowing a ten percent reduction in compen-
sation when the injury or death is due to the fault of the employee), -60 (1976)(allowing
no compensation when the injury or death of the employee is caused by the intoxication
or wilfullness of the employee).
4. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-15-70 (1976)(medical expenses), -10 (1976)(amount of
compensation for total disability); § 42-9-20 (Supp. 1980) (amount of compensation for
partial disability).
5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560 (Supp. 1980)(rights and remedies against third
party).
6. Id.
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (1976)(employee's rights and remedies under
workmen's compensation exclude all others against the employer).
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compelled to bring suit against a third party.8 Action against a
third party is in the interest of the employer, who may have con-
tributed in large part to the accident, because even the limited
exposure of the employer may be recouped through subrogation
against the manufacturer of the product.9
When manufacturers sell products to employers, they pre-
sumably have no desire to be sued by injured employees; and
they presumably want to make products as safe as the state of
the art permits, provided the marketplace demands and will pay
for safe products. Manufacturers, however, do not control the
manner in which products are used, the safety procedures that
are observed on the job, or the environment in which the prod-
uct is used. These conditions are controlled by employers. More-
over, the economic burden of products liability losses does not
fall as strongly on employers, and employers' decisions are gov-
erned by an economic incentive to keep the cost of products
down. When an injury occurs, an employer can pay an injured
employee the exclusive remedy of workmen's compensation ben-
efits and then attempt to recoup this payment by participating
in an action against the manufacturer. 10 It comes as no surprise
that both the employee and the manufacturer of the product
emerge from this process less than satisfied. '
The difficulties that emerge are reflected in the voluminous
amount of both litigation and legislation in South Carolina and
across the nation during recent years. South Carolina has en-
acted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts"" and
8. Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Em-
ployer, 65 Nw. L. REV. 351, 419-20 (1970).
9. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560 (Supp. 1980).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical
harm, thereby caused to the ultimate user, or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Section 402A has been codified in South Carolina at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10
1981] 275
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the state supreme court has recently had several opportunities
to consider the question of when the absence of a safety device
or warning is an unreasonably dangerous defect.12 These cases
have presented difficult questions associated with the allegation
that a product is defective when a safety device or warning is
not provided. The decisions examine the question of liability by
addressing such issues as whether the defect was the proximate
cause of the injury,13 whether the injury to the plaintiff was rea-
sonably foreseeable,1 ' whether the defendant manufacturer was
under a duty to the injured plaintiff, 5 how an open and obvious
danger should affect the manufacturer's duty to give warnings,,
what knowledge will be expected of a reasonable user, what
knowledge the particular user had,18 to whom warnings should
have been directed,19 and whether there is a distinction between
the liability of a seller and of a manufacturer. 0
The Uniform Products Liability Act (U.P.L.A.) 21 has given
particular attention to the basis of liability and standards of re-
sponsibility for manufacturers in design and warning cases22 and
has afforded special treatment to the relationship between prod-
ucts liability and workmen's compensation in workplace inju-
ries. 3 In addition, the U.P.L.A. provides for a number of other
specific reforms in products liability law.2 '
This article attempts to outline the law of South Carolina
concerning liability for design and warning defects in workplace
(1976). See note 132 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Marchant v. Lorain Div. of Koehring (Marchant II), 272 S.C. 243, 251
S.E.2d 189 (1979); Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171 , 246 S.E.2d 176
(1978); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978); Marchant v.
Mitchell Distrib. Co. (Marchant I), 270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977).
13. E.g., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
14. E.g., id. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 680; 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).
15. E.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
16. E.g., 270 S.C. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
17. E.g., id. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675; 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176.
18. 271 S.C. at 176, 246 S.E.2d at 178.
19. E.g., 272 S.C. at 248, 251 S.E.2d at 192; 270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977). See
text accompanying note 113 infra.
20. E.g., 272 S.C. at 246, 251 S.E.2d at 191; 270 S.C. at 37, 240 S.E.2d at 514.
21. Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)[hereinafter cited as
U.P.L.A.]. See notes 106-131 and accompanying text infra.
22. Id. §§ 104(B),(C), at 62,721.
23. Id. § 114, at 62,740.
24. See text accompanying notes 118-21 infra.
[Vol. 33
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products and to compare South Carolina law to the U.P.L.A. It
will explore problems that arise from the overlap of the statu-
tory workmen's compensation system, in which benefits are
based on a relationship, and the tort recovery system, in which
benefits are based on fault. Finally, the article will suggest ways
in which those problems may be reduced or eliminated.
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING DEFECT IN DESIGN AND
WARNING CASES
The search for a sound test for determining if a product is
defective has been perhaps the most difficult analytical problem
in the field of products liability,25 and it has yet to be resolved
by any consensus among the courts. The varied formulations of-
fered by courts and commentators to analyze products liability
cases can generally be categorized as either consumer expecta-
tions tests or risk-benefit tests.
The consumer expectations test may be stated broadly as
follows: If a consumer reasonably expects that a product may be
safely used for a particular purpose, the product is defective if it
fails to meet those expectations.26 The consumer expectations
test has been criticized for creating a barrier to recovery; in the
case of obvious hazards, a consumer's expectations could never
be frustrated.27 Moreover, the test may be too elusive when con-
sumer attitudes are not sufficiently crystallized to define an ex-
pected standard or when a product's technology is beyond the
understanding of the consumer.2 8
The word "consumer" is troublesome because employees or
bystanders are not the purchasers of products used in the work-
place and probably are not consumers within the common mean-
25. See P. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONTGOMERY, CASES & MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS
LISEIrY AND SAFETY, 224-69 (1980)[hereinafter cited as P. KEETON]; Owen, Restructur-
ing Products Liability Law, 16 TRIAL 58 (1980).
26. See P. KEETON, supra note 25, at 225-38.
27. Id. at 228. See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Prod-
uct Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1969); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 348-52 (1974); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectation: A
Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L.
REv. 465 (1978); Rheingold, What are the Consumer's Reasonable Expectations?, 22
Bus. L. 589 (1976); Shappo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doc-
trine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109,
1302-16 (1974).
28. Dickerson, supra note 27, at 307.
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ing of the term.2" The word "expectations" is troublesome be-
cause it is subjective, and its meaning may vary among
consumers and triers of fact. Although objectivity may be en-
hanced by requiring the expectation to be that of a reasonable
consumer, the concept nevertheless remains elusive. "Expecta-
tions" also loses power in the realm of sophisticated products
that are purchased by employers and used by employees, each of
whom may have different expectations. Employees' expectations
of a safe workplace are directed primarily toward the environ-
ment controlled by employers rather than products provided by
manufacturers. Employers may be knowledgeable about avail-
able design choices and may have sufficient understanding to
put products in their workplace in a safe manner. Employers,
however, are unlikely to be injured and may not have the same
personal incentive for achieving safety that individual consum-
ers have for themselves. Thus, both employees' expectations of a
safe workplace and manufacturers' expectations that products
will be used safely in the workplace may be frustrated by an
employer's lack of incentive to insure that a product is used in a
safe manner.
Recognizing weaknesses in the consumer expectations test,
the drafters of the U.P.L.A. did not adopt the test in design
cases and made it only one component of the analysis for deter-
mining defectiveness in warning cases.30 The most important ob-
jections of the drafters were that the consumer does not know
what to expect, each trier of fact is likely to have a different
abstract view of consumer expectations, most consumers cannot
evaluate conscious design choices, and the consumer expecta-
tions test is therefore too subjective to be practicable.3 1
The second test for defectiveness is the risk-benefit test. Al-
though many elements might be included, the basic determina-
tion is whether a product meets society's standards of accepta-
bility given the risks, benefits, costs, and possible alternatives.3 2
29. The word "consumer" refers to "individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and
dispose of products or services." BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY 286 (5th ed. 1979).
30. U.P.L.A. §§ 104(B)(design defects), (C)(waming defects), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
31. Id., analysis, at 62,724.
32. Several formulations have been proposed in addition to those found in the
U.P.L.A. One list of considerations proposed by Dean Wade is as follows:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
[Vol. 33
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The balancing of risks, benefits, and costs is a familiar and natu-
ral decision model for individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments. It has the advantages of rewarding efficiency and provid-
ing an economic incentive to manufacture safe products while
avoiding pricing products out of existence with requirements for
greater safety than the products' use warrants. Risk-benefit
analysis from the legal viewpoint is analagous to the cost-benefit
analysis that manufacturers use when making design choices.
The risk-benefit test would seem, therefore, to be the more use-
ful analysis in design cases.$$
When the analysis shifts to warning cases, however, the
risk-benefit test becomes less useful. The very nature of select-
ing an effective warning requires consideration of users' under-
standing and expectations about a product. Because warnings
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without imparing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
Another interesting proposal is found in Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the The-
ory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv.
803, 818 (1976):
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the product about
which the plaintiff complains-the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the offending
condition-the manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological utility occasioned by the elim-
ination of the offending condition-the public's safety cost.
(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to
(a) recognize the risks of the condition,
(b) reduce such risks and
(c) absorb or insure against such risks-the allocation of risk aware-
ness and control between the manufacturer and the consumer.
Id. See P. KEETON, supra note 25, at 247-48.
33. See P. KEETON, supra note 25, at 238-40.
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are designed to create or alter expections and knowledge, fore-
seeing expectations is essential to choosing good warnings. Too
many warnings on products may create the impression of a false
cry of alarm that predictably results in complacency and failure
to heed; too few warnings may allow danger to go undisclosed.
The level of technological sophistication may also make it diffi-
cult to achieve a meaningful warning. A further problem arises
concerning who should be warned. The employer, the employee
who uses the product, and the employee who is injured are fre-
quently different individuals with different levels of understand-
ing and different expectations. The U.P.L.A.'s analysis attempts
to resolve these difficulties in warnings by combining concepts of
risk-balancing, foreseeability, expectations, and technological
feasibility.
34
The level of product safety is frequently a blend of warning
and design,3 5 and neither the consumer expectations test nor the
risk-benefit test offers a satisfactory solution in every instance.
Frequently, a particular risk may be eliminated either by design-
ing a safety device or by issuing a warning or by adopting some
combination of both. These options complicate the selection of
the appropriate U.P.L.A. test-the design test, the warning test,
or a combination of the two-for application in specific cases.
Moreover, the difficulty is compounded when one takes products
liability law into the workplace where it overlaps with the work-
men's compensation system.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE OVERLAP BETWEEN PRODUCTS LIABmiTY
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The problems of overlap between products liability law and
34. U.P.L.A. § 104, analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. This section is set forth in the
text accompanying note 116 infra.
35. Barker v. Lull Eng'r. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Tort-A Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972); Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TENN. L. Rnv. 439 (1969); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning
of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of
"Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559 (1969);
Phillips, A Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 101 (1977); Traynor, The Ways & Meanings of Defective Products & Strict Liabil-
ity, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 n.1 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965).
[Vol. 33
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/6
PRODUCTS LIABILITy
workmen's compensation legislation have been clearly described
by Professor Larson:
Perhaps the most evenly balanced controversy in all of work-
men's compensation law is the question whether a third party
in an action by the employee can recover over against the em-
ployer, when the employer's fault has caused or contributed to
the injury."
Each side to this controversy has an argument in its favor
which, considered alone, sounds irresistible. The employer
complains with considerable cogency that the net result is that
[money] has been put in the employee's pocket and has left the
employer's pocket, all because of the compensable injury-in
spite of the plain statement in the workmen's compensation
act that the employer's liability for such an injury shall be lim-
ited to compensation payments.
37
Yet, if the third party were made to bear the entire
[money] damages, he would argue with equal cogency that it is
unfair to subject him, the lesser of two wrongdoers, to a stag-
gering liability which he would not have had to bear but for
the sheer chance that the other parties involved happen to be
under a compensation system. Why should he, a stranger to
the compensation system, subsidize that system by assuming
liabilities that he could normally shift to, or share with, the
employer?38
In an industrial setting, employers may be at fault in creat-
ing a dangerous working environment for a correctly made prod-
uct. They sometimes fail to pass along appropriate warnings or
instructions and often modify products, rendering them un-
safe. 9 Even when employers are at fault, they are permitted
through subrogation to assert claims against manufacturers who
may be free from fault or very marginally at fault;40 they have a
strong economic incentive to assert even questionable claims
against manufacturers. Employees have the same economic in-
centives to assert questionable claims against manufacturers but
36. Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Em-
ployer, 65 Nw. L. REv. 351 (1970).
37. Id. at 352. What seems to support this irresistible argument is the existence of
the workmen's compensation statutory scheme of compensation. If the statute is
changed, it is possible to make the argument disappear. Id.
38. Id. at 352.
39. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 48.
40. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560 (Supp. 1980).
1981]
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have no similar incentive to assert claims against their employ-
ers.'1 The argument against recovery over by third-party manu-
facturers against employers recognizes that it indirectly evades
the underlying spirit of workmen's compensation law that the
employee has bargained with the employer to exchange com-
mon-law rights for limited but assured statutory benefits.42
The overlap between products liability law and workmen's
compensation legislation has created several undesirable results.
First, because workmen's compensation benefits are often inade-
quate, injured parties frequently feel compelled to seek adequate
tort recoveries from sympathetic juries in cases of serious in-
jury.43 Second, shifting the compensation burden to manufactur-
ers may leave manufacturers with burdens under which they
cannot continue to function."
Courts, realizing that the plaintiff was without an adequate
remedy against his employer, have stretched the law to provide
an action against the manufacturer. Whether this is desirable
or not is a matter of opinion. The phenomenon is very real and
must give the reader pause when attempting to extrapolate
principles from industrial accident cases to consumer products
cases.4
5
Still other problems arise. For example, in warning cases,
the statutory immunity of employers may reduce their incentive
to transmit warnings. Employers are the usual recipients of all
warnings and directions from the manufacturer, but even ade-
quate warnings are ineffective when employers fail to pass them
on to their employees. Nevertheless, even when the manufac-
turer has properly attempted to avoid danger, the injured em-
ployee must sue the manufacturer to recover in tort.4" Finally,
the societal interest in deterring irresponsible behavior is frus-
trated when a negligent employer avoids responsibility by stand-
ing behind the exclusive remedy shield of the workmen's com-
41. Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation, and the Industrial Ac-
cident, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 349, 381 (1976).
42. Larson, supra note 36, at 419-20.
43. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 381.
44. Id. at 382-83.
45. A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LiArn~m & A
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT 108 (1978).
46. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 379.
[Vol. 33282
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pensation statute.4 Judge Traynor, quoting a North Carolina
decision, has illustrated this point as follows:
[W]hen the employee or his estate has been satisfied, and the
employer seeks to recover the amount paid by him, from such
third party, his hands ought not to have the blood of the dead
or injured workman upon them, when he thus invokes the im-
partial powers and processes of the law.
48
A. Divergent Historical Development of Workmen's
Compensation and Products Liability
In large measure, the inconsistent overlap between the stat-
utory benefits system of workmen's compensation and the tort
recovery system of products liability stems from their distinct
historical roots.
1. The History of Products Liability.-The common law has
moved very rapidly. Professor White points out that the emer-
gence of the separate branch of law known as torts occurred as
recently as the late nineteenth century 9 with the first American
treatise appearing in 185950 and the first casebook in 1874.5' The
merger of tort and contract principles in the field of products
liability began in England with Wright v. Winterbottom51 and in
the United States with Thomas v. Winchester,"3 Devlin v.
Smith," and McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,55 a decision fre-
quently credited as the origin of American products liability.
The citadel of privity of contract has fallen,5" and the South
47. Id. at 383.
48. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d 57, 71, 366 P.2d 641, 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377
(1961) (citing Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C., 668, 669, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933)). See
Mitchell, supra note 41, at 367-68.
49. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMmuCm: AN INTELLEcTUAL HISTORY 3 (1980); White,
The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671 (1977). See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1-27 (4th ed. 1971).
50. F. HILARD, THE LAw OF TORTS (1859). See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AmERI-
CAN LAW 409 (1973).
51. J. AMES, A SLECTION OF CASES ON LAW OF TORTS (1874). See Rothenburg, Book
Review, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 373, 377 (1975).
52. 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
53. 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
54. 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311 (1882).
55. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
56. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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Carolina Supreme Court has recently sought "to still all whis-
pers of its continued existence. ' 57 With the elimination of the
privity of contract issue, the expansion of recovery has contin-
ued. This expansion was justified in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.'s on the ground that the manufacturers or sponsors
of a product are usually in a better position to absorb the eco-
nomic burden of losses.5 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,"° the California Supreme Court held that
[t]o establish the manufacturer's liability, it [is] sufficient that
plaintiff [prove] that he was injured while using the [product]
in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.61
The most dramatic growth of products liability has occurred
since the publication in 1965 of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.6 2 A sample of eight states taken by the Inter-
agency Task Force on Products Liability showed that the num-
ber of reported products liability cases doubled between the
1965-70 period and the 1971-76 period. 3 As a reflection of this
trend, sections on products liability appeared for the first time
in American Jurisprudence 2d in 1972 6 and in the 1976 supple-
ment to Corpus Juris Secundum.e5
It has been observed that the distinctions between the vari-
ous doctrines of products liability are more theoretical than
practical. 6 The three theories of negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability have merged through the development of case
law after the publication of section 402A. Each theory requires
that the plaintiff's injury be the result of some defect in the
product. For that reason, the most difficult and basic question
57. JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 274 S.C. 413, 419, 265 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1980).
58. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
59. Id. at 360, 161 A.2d at 72.
60. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
61. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
62. See note 11 supra.
63. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1.
64. 63 At. JUR. 2D Products Liability §§ 1-227 (1972).
65. 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 77 (Supp. 1976).
66. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 282 F. Supp. 906, 908 n.1 (D.S.C. 1968); Royal v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 1968).
67. For the text of section 402A, see note 11 supra.
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confronting courts is the meaning of "defect." One commentator
has asserted that the courts are not properly equipped to make
technologically sophisticated determinations about a product's
condition and are being strained to the breaking point."" The
most important controversy, however, concerns the manner in
which the courts should resolve two divergent points of view.
One view holds that the plaintiff should only be required to
prove that he has been injured and that some product was in-
volved. 9 On the other hand, some argue strongly that manufac-
turers' liability has already been extended to the point that the
capital goods industry is endangered and retraction is
necessary.
70
The contention that safety is given too little emphasis has
been expressed as follows:
Unfortunately, the notion held by many outside the engineer-
ing profession, that the product design process always involves
a sophisticated fine tuning of carefully articulated and quanti-
fied parameters, is a myth. As we have indicated elsewhere,
every product is a compromise between quantifiable aspects of
design and the uncertainties of actual performance of the prod-
uct in the environment of its use. This gap is usually closed by
the safety factor (really a factor of ignorance) which is a sub-
stantive judgmental response to the inherent uncertainties in
any design. This response to the technological uncertainties en-
demic in the design process, when joined with the pressures
from marketing efforts, production costs, and competing prod-
ucts, serves to dispel the notion that a sacrosanct product will
necessarily emerge from these competing pressures. Safety is
often a stepchild in the design process and is usually addressed
as an afterthought.71
Yet the point of view that courts have gone too far in reducing
the plaintiff's burden in litigation also has its adherents:
68. Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORmLL L. REV. 541, 556-57
(1976).
69. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORN.LL L. REV. 495
(1976).
70. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Law - A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRA L. REv. 221 (1977-78). See Uniform Products Liability
Law §§ 106(D), (E), 107(B), 109(B)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 2,999-3,000 (1979).
71. Twerski, supra note 69, at 528.
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A note of blunt truthfulness is in order. What we fear with the
consumer expectation test is that the court will turn over to
the jury borderline cases that have little merit. Once these
cases enter into the grist of jury decision-making, there is a
reluctance by appellate courts to reverse jury verdicts. This
problem lurks behind the establishment of a clear and convinc-
ing standard of proof for several issues raised within the
U.P.L.A. 72
The drafters of the U.P.L.A. share the latter concern over
expanded recovery. Because they were concerned with the effi-
cacy of the strict liability system as a mechanism for distribut-
ing the cost of product-related injuries in all cases,"3 the drafters
abandoned strict liability in both design cases and warning cases
and established separate tests for each of these two categories.7 4
2. The Historical Development of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law.-The fault basis that has been the theme of tort law
stands in sharp contrast to the compensation system that has
developed around workplace accidents. Pursuant to workmen's
compensation legislation, the test of liability is based on the em-
ployment relationship rather than on conduct. The test is
whether a work-connected injury has taken place, and fault is
not an issue. In return for speedy adjudication of claims and
diminished proof of eligibility under a workmen's compensation
statute, employees waive their common-law right to sue employ-
ers and accept a reduced but more secure form of recovery.76
While the widespread assertion of products liability claims is of
relatively recent vintage, workmen's compensation has been a
strong force in the workplace since the late 1800s. It does not
have direct common-law roots, nor has there been any chance
for the common law to shape employer-employee litigation in
the manner that it has shaped the development of products lia-
bility law. Workmen's compensation legislation originated in
nineteenth century Germany with a plan set out by Bismarck for
compulsory insurance in the workplace.77 The plan was a politi-
72. Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 70, at 232-33.
73. U.P.L.A. § 104, analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
74. See notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text infra. See also text accompanying
notes 31-36 supra & 148 infra.
75. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 5.10, at 5 (1978).
76. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 352-53.
77. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 5.00 at 33.
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cal effort by the practical Socialists to counter the increasing po-
litical strength of Marxian-type Socialists.78
During the nineteenth century in England, the fear of an
adverse impact on the development of business resulted in the
creation of the fellow servant exception to the common-law prin-
ciple of vicarious liability of the master for the torts of his ser-
vant.79 The fellow servant rule, contributory negligence, and vol-
untary assumption of risk doctrines shifted losses resulting from
injuries to employees from the employer to the injured work-
man, who was unable to sustain such a loss.80 In the United
States, by the end of the nineteenth century, an increasing vol-
ume of uncompensated injuries forced a change.8 In 1910, the
New York Commission made a report based on a study of the
German plan, which was the basis for New York's Compensation
Act.82 From these beginnings, the evolution of workmen's com-
pensation has resulted in a present concern about inadequacy of
recovery in certain instances, lack of incentive for claims against
culpable employers, and the unfair shifting of burdens from the
employers' enterprises to third-party enterprises in accidents
concerning products.8 s
The rash of products liability claims by injured workmen
who have already received compensation benefits is indicative of
the inadequacy of the benefits in cases with major injuries.84 The
struggle in the courts to find an acceptable manner by which to
apportion the economic burden of the injury among culpable en-
terprises is indicative of the inequities in the exclusive remedy
feature of the workmen's compensation system, which bars third
party contribution or indemnification over against an employer
by a manufacturer.85 The struggle over contribution and indem-
nity and the existence of statutory provisions in some workmen's
compensation systems for increased benefits upon proof of moral
78. Id. § 5.10, at 34.
79. Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M & W 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
80. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 104-05.
81. Id. at 105; A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 5.20, at 37.
82. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 5.10, at 36.
83. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 106-08; Mitchell, supra note 41, at 355.
84. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1.
85. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-580 (1976)(detailing the rights of a third party
against employer or employee's recovery).
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fault by the employer"6 are indicative of the inadequacy and un-
fairness of incentives to assert claims against the employer.
B. Evaluation of the Law of Products Liability and the Law
of Workmen's Compensation
1. The Tort Law System.-In the few years since the ap-
pearance of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,87 the common law of torts has moved dramatically. Evalu-
ation of the success of the tort recovery system following the in-
troduction of section 402A must be based on an appraisal of the
system's effectiveness in meeting its goals. The goals of the tort
law system have been summarized as follows:s8
It is believed that the objectives of tort law can be summed up,
both historically and sociologically, under four fairly simple
heads, as follows:
(1) A punitive objective, closely allied to traditional ideas
of morality which have been manifested in criminal law: the
punishment of bad actors for their bad acts.
(2) A deterrence objective, the law being designed either to
produce fear of sanctions, thus deterring tortious activity, or
otherwise to make such activity so obviously disadvantageous
that people will not engage in it. Under this head "accident
prevention" is what the law seeks.
(3) A distribution of losses objective, calling for a system
that will reasonably compensate those who suffer injuries and
will impose the cost of compensation equitably upon those who
should reasonably and without undue hardship bear that cost.
(4) A negative objective, of not unduly discouraging so-
cially desirable enterprise and activity by imposing upon them
financial or regulatory burdens that will stifle or substantially
inhibit them.8'
In the context of industrial accidents, it would seem that
these objectives of tort law are not well served. At a minimum,
the employee recovers his workmen's compensation benefits
86. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 355-56. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-70 (1976).
87. For the text of section 402A, see note 11 supra.
88. R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 16 (1974).
89. Id. A similar list of goals is given by Dean Prosser: (1) moral aspects of defen-
dant's conduct; (2) historical development; (3) convenience of administration; (4) capac-
ity to bear loss; and (5) prevention of punishment. W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 16-23
(4th ed. 1971).
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from the employer. In instances when either the employer or the
employee or both are at fault, neither is punished. The employee
receives the same, and the employer pays the same regardless of
their respective conduct. In those instances where the employer
and sometimes the employee engage in dangerous conduct, there
is no strong deterrent against such conduct. The distribution of
loss objective may be fulfilled if the worker can recover from a
third party, but this depends entirely on the fortuitous circum-
stances of the accident. A worker who is injured as a result of a
defective product wins extra tort recovery, but another worker
who is injured as a result of some other cause does not get the
extra tort recovery; their compensation is unequal, and this re-
sult is difficult to justify. The development of products liability
law has now reached the point at which it may discourage some
socially desirable enterprises by imposing potentially stifling
burdens on manufacturers that should be reduced and shared by
employers of injured workers.90
Products liability litigation has been strongly criticized not
only by the manufacturing industry but also by those who sup-
port more recovery for claimants. One critic has said that prod-
ucts liability litigation and the entire common-law liability sys-
tem are cumbersome, wasteful, and cruel, resulting in delayed
payments and the consumption of a large portion of the avail-
able funds in administrative and investigative costs and legal
fees for plaintiffs and defendants.9 1 To the extent that such crit-
icism is justified, the goals of the tort law system in the context
of products liability in the workplace are not being well served
at the present time.
2. The Workmen's Compensation System.-The workmen's
compensation system does not purport to distribute losses in the
same manner as the tort recovery system. Instead, it gives the
claimant a sum that, when added to his remaining earning ca-
pacity, will prevent his being a burden to others:92
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is
belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most
90. See P. KFaTON, supra note 25, at 996.
91. O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third Party Torts Claims: An Answer to
Products Liability Woes for Employers & Their Employees & Suppliers, 2 L. REFORM
435, 436-37 (1976).
92. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.50, at 11.
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dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits
for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlight-
ened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in
some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of
these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.93
Furthermore, unlike the tort system, the compensation system
provides recovery only for injuries that produce a disability or
an effect on earning power.94 Certain disfigurements, destruction
of sexual potency, loss of child-bearing capacity, pain and suffer-
ing, and loss of consortium are not recoverable in the compensa-
tion system.95
There is no intent that workmen's compensation benefits
should equal the actual amount of the loss. Aside from any con-
sideration of whether such benefits are affordable, it might be
expected that full pay for no work would encourage malinger-
ing.9 '8 The compensation system has goals of loss distribution,
security for work-connected injuries in a dignified manner, and
presumably some incentive for the employer to provide safe
working conditions because he must initially bear the cost of
workmen's compensation insurance.97 An ancillary goal of the
workmen's compensation system is its elimination of friction
that occurs between adversaries in a traditional lawsuit."8
Evaluation of the success of the workmen's compensation
system must be based on an examination of what the system
accomplishes. Most statutes award between one-half and two-
thirds of average weekly wages,99 and virtually all of the acts set
a maximum award, which is usually sufficient to maintain the
93. Id. § 2.20, at 5.
94. For relevant South Carolina Code sections, see note 4 supra.
95. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.40, at 10-11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-
30(21)(1976)(disfigurement compensation); Lowery v. Wade Hampton Co., 270 S.C. 194,
241 S.E.2d 556 (1978)(barring action by husband for loss of consortium); Workmen's
Compensation, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 153, 158 (1979).
96. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.50, at 12. This does not seem to be a consideration
in the tort system even when collateral sources of recovery exist.
97. Id. § 3.20, at 17-18.
98. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 45, at 106.
99. Section 42-9-10 of the South Carolina Code provides, in pertinent part- "When
the incapacity for work resulting in an injury is total, the employer shall pay ... weekly
compensation to equal sixty-six and two-thirds % of his weekly wages, but not less than
twenty-five dollars a week. .. " S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10 (Supp. 1980).
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claimant at only a subsistence level.100 Furthermore, settlements
are often paid in a lump sum,110 permitting employees to spend
the benefits quickly and imprudently. Evidence of the ineffec-
tiveness of this system of recovery in some instances is the al-
ready mentioned plethora of products liability cases by injured
workmen against third-party manufacturers.0 2 In cases with
major injuries, if workmen's compensation awards were ade-
quate and paid out periodically like wages, an employee would
have little incentive to bring an independent action against a
third-party manufacturer because the employee would already
have a substantially adequate remedy. In addition, most of the
damages recovered would simply go to reimburse the em-
ployer.103 In cases with minor injuries, however, few employers
could be persuaded on the basis of the number and amounts of
awards in cases with minor injuries that the compensation sys-
tem today offers any meaningful incentive against malingering.
On the contrary, the nuisance of defense costs and the inconve-
nience to the employer encourage overpayment of small claims.
With respect to loss distribution, the workmen's compensa-
tion system has been accused of failing to meet its goals.0 In
theory, liability under the compensation system should provide
assistance to the employee without hurting the employer who
can pass the loss to the consumer.1 05 However, when the shift is
made from theory to practice, it is clear that in some instances,
the employer's enterprise is not assuming the loss and passing it
on to its consumers. Rather, the employer and the employee can
join forces to impose a severe loss on a third-party manufacturer
who cannot pass all of the loss on to its own consumers. An ex-
ample of the potentially severe consequences is found in the af-
termath of the leading case of Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing
100. A. LaSON, supra note 75, § 2.50 at 11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (1976,
repealed 1978)(providing that the total compensation payable under this title shall in no
case exceed forty thousand dollars).
101. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (Supp. 1980). See Administrative Law, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 29 S.C.L. REv. 11 (1978).
102. See U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, supra note 1.
103. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-50 (Supp. 1980) ("[T]he carrier [employer] shall
have a lien on the proceeds from any recovery from the third party ... to the extent of
the total amount of compensation. .. ").
104. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 354-55.
105. A. LAwSON, supra note 75, § 2.70, at 13.
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Corp.106 As a result of products liability litigation, the defendant
manufacturer decided to go out of business. 107 Although going
out of business may be unusual, the inability of third-party
manufacturers to pass on all of the loss is not unusual; substan-
tial losses and employment cutbacks may be expected. It is re-
grettable when other employees lose jobs and when stockhold-
ers-frequently employee pension plans-lose their investments.
There is a more important problem that arises. The third
party manufacturer may be able to bear the loss but should not
because the real ability to control the safety of the work envi-
ronment rests with the employer. This is one of the most critical
faults of the present overlap between products liability and
workmen's compensation. If injury is to be prevented, the one
who is in fact able to prevent the loss must have an incentive to
prevent it, and frequently this is the employer rather than the
manufacturer or seller.
Finally, problems may arise when different jurisdictions of-
fer different levels of compensation. Professor Larson notes the
example of Wisconsin's having increased its compensation bene-
fits for silicosis before neighboring states did, with the result
that its granite and monument works were forced out of busi-
ness.10 8 In that instance, it seems that the employees of the
granite and monument works in Wisconsin might well have pre-
ferred reduced workmen's compensation benefits to unemploy-
ment or forced relocation to a neighboring state that had lower
compensation benefits but a healthy granite and monument
industry.
In summary, it appears that the present workmen's com-
pensation system is not effectively meeting its goals. The loss
distribution mechanism is inequitable, the system provides no
proper incentive pattern to induce a safe working environment,
overpayment commonly occurs in cases with minor injuries, and,
in cases with major injuries, awards may not permit employees
to maintain themselves with reasonable dignity." 9
106. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
107. (P. KEETON, supra note 25, at 996.
108. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.70, at 14 n.18.
109. It may be noted that in addition to the inadequacy of the compensation pro-
vided, awards are frequently paid in a lump sum that may be quickly dissipated, leaving
the former employee in difficult financial circumstances and allowing him to become a
ward of the state.
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IV. SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACT
11 o
The Department of Commerce has recently published the
model Uniform Products Liability Act.111 The goals of the Act
include the following:
(1) To ensure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe
products receive reasonable compensation for their injuries.
(2) To ensure the availability of affordable products liabil-
ity insurance with adequate coverage to product sellers that
engage in reasonably safe manufacturing practices.
(3) To place the incentive for loss prevention on the party
or parties who are best able to accomplish that goal.
(4) To expedite the reparations process from the time of
injury to the time the claim is paid.
(5) To minimize the sum of accident costs, prevention
costs, and transactions costs.112
A. U.P.L.A. Provisions Applicable to Design and Warning
Cases
Section 104 of the U.P.L.A., entitled "Basic Standards of
Responsibility for Manufacturers," provides that a product man-
ufacturer is subject to liability if the product that caused harm
was defective.11 It provides further that, among other things, a
product is defective if it is unreasonably unsafe in design or un-
reasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instructions
were not provided.
114
In the context of design and warning cases, the drafters of
the Act were concerned with the difficulty of analysis and the
potential for overkill against a manufacturer and, therefore,
110. See note 21 supra. There have been a variety of writings both criticizing and
supporting various features of the U.P.L.A. See, e.g., Twerski & Weinstein, supra note
68; Henderson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Design: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978). It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze all of
the proposals that have been offered. The author's purpose is a comparative analysis of
the U.P.L.A. and South Carolina law.
111. U.P.L.A., 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,713.
112. Id. at 62,714-15.
113. Id. at 62,721.
114. In cases that do not concern design or warning problems, a product is defective
if "[i]t was unreasonably unsafe in construction; . . . [i]t was unreasonably unsafe be-
cause it did not conform to the product sellers express warranty ... ." Id. § 104 at
62,721.
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placed both design and warning cases on a "fault" basis, albeit a
rather tepid version of fault.115 With respect to design cases, sec-
tion 104(B)(1) of the U.P.L.A. provides as follows:
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably un-
safe in design, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of
manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the
claimant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those
harms outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a
product that would have prevented those harms, and the ad-
verse effect that alternative design would have on the useful-
ness of the product.116
With respect to warnings, section 104(C)(1) of the Act provides
as follows:
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably un-
safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not pro-
vided about a danger connected with the product or its proper
use, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufac-
ture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claim-
ant's harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms
rendered the manufacturer's instructions inadequate and that
the manufacturer should and could have provided the instruc-
tions or warnings which claimant alleges would have been
adequate. 1 7
115. Id.
116. Id. § 104, analysis, at 62,722. Section 104(B)(2) of the Act suggests considera-
tion of the following examples of evidence when making determinations of design
defectiveness:
(a) Any warnings and instructions provided with the product;
(b) The technological and practical feasibility of a product designed and
manufactured so as to have prevented claimant's harm while substantially
serving the likely user's expected needs;
(c) The effect of any proposed alternative design on the usefulness of the
product;
(d) The comparative cost of producing, distributing, selling, using, and
maintaining the product as designed and as alternatively designed;
(e) The new or additional harms that might have resulted if the product
had been so alternatively designed.
Id. § 104(B)(2) at 62,721.
117. Id. § 104(C) at 62,721. Section 104(C)(2) of the Act suggests consideration of
the following examples of evidence when making determinations about the adequacy of
warnings:
(a) The manufacturer's ability at the time of manufacture, to be aware of
the product's danger and the nature of the potential harm;
(b) The manufacturer's ability to anticipate that the likely product user
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The Act distinguishes between the positions of manufac-
turer and seller once a product has been found defective under
the fault criteria outlined above and has been screened by the
court.""" If a seller has not engaged in conduct that contributes
to the condition of the product, has not made an express war-
ranty, and has not assumed the role of a manufacturer, that
seller is subject to liability under the Act only when one of three
conditions exists: the product manufacturer is not subject to ser-
vice of process under the laws of the claimant's domicile; the
manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent; or the court
finds that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment
against the manufacturer." 9
The U.P.L.A. offers incentives for safe conduct and behav-
ior and equitable loss distribution by imposing comparative re-
sponsibility and apportionment of damages.' 20 The Act further
provides for contribution and implied indemnity among multiple
defendants.1
2
1
With respect to the overlap between products liability and
workmen's compensation, the U.P.L.A. specifies that damages in
a tort action against a third-party manufacturer be reduced by
the amount paid or to be paid as workmen's compensation bene-
fits. 22 The solution adopted in the U.P.L.A. eliminates employer
subrogation and provides a partial contribution or indemnity to
the product manufacturer against the employer not to exceed
the amount of the compensation benefits due.' 23 The Analysis
accompanying this provision explains that the drafters rejected a
requirement of full contribution when the employer is at fault
because they believed such a requirement would thwart the con-
would be aware of the product's danger and the nature of the potential harm;
(c) The technological and practical feasibility of providing adequate warn-
ings and instructions;
(d) The clarity and conspicuousness of the warnings or instructions that
were provided; and
(e) The adequacy of warnings or instructions that were provided.
Id. § 104(C)(2) at 62,721.
118. Id. § 105(C), at 62,726.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 111, at 62,734-35. See generally Ribstein, Examining the Plaintiff's Con-
duct Under the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 46 J. Am L. 389 (1981).
121. U.P.L.A. § 113, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,739.
122. Id. § 114(A), at 62,740.
123. Id. § 114(B), at 62,740.
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cept underlying the workmen's compensation system and would
increase transactions costs. 124 Nevertheless, the Analysis sug-
gests that the Interagency Task Force12 5 was dissatisfied with
the solution offered by the U.P.L.A. by noting that the present
system dulls employer incentives to keep workplace products
safe and that workmen's compensation as a sole source of recov-
ery in product-related workplace accidents would be the best so-
lution to the entire problem, but only if benefits are revised and
increased.
126
B. Miscellaneous Reforms Under the U.P.L.A. for Products
Liability Cases
A number of specific reforms in the U.P.L.A. are not unique
to design and warning cases and do not have a special relation-
ship to workplace accidents. They may be adopted or rejected
piecemeal by either statute or decision, and they apply to manu-
facturing, design, and warning defects and to both workplace
and consumer accidents. Although analysis of these reforms is
beyond the scope of this article, brief reference to the more sig-
nificant provisions will illuminate the overall scheme developed
by the Interagency Task Force and demonstrate a felt need to
place limits on recovery.
Because the drafters did not wish to introduce hindsight by
juries into risk-benefit analysis,127 the Act provides for an initial
screening by the court before cases reach a jury.125 The drafters
recognized that parties to lawsuits advance claims and defenses
that are sometimes frivolous and sanctions against such claims
are therefore incorporated in the Act.129 The U.P.L.A. shifts to
the claimant the burden to prove that a reasonably prudent
product seller would have taken additional precautions if the in-
jury-causing aspect of a product was, at the time of manufac-
ture, in compliance with legislative or administrative regulatory
safety standards relating to design or performance.130 Compli-
124. Id. § 114, analysis, at 62,740-41.
125. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
126. U.P.L.A. § 114, analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740-41.
127. Id. § 104(B), analysis, at 62,723.
128. Id. § 104, at 62,721.
129. Id. § 115, at 62,741.
130. Id. § 108(A), at 62,730.
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ance, at the time of manufacture, with mandatory government
contract specifications is an absolute defense.13 1
In an effort to reduce transaction costs, the U.P.L.A. pro-
vides for arbitration in certain instances. 13 2 The Act permits
courts to screen nonpecuniary damages' and provides an ex-
ception to the collateral source rule for any compensation from a
public sources"3 Further, the Act gives courts the duty to deter-
mine the amount of punitive damages once the trier of fact has
determined that punitive damages should be awarded.135 Finally,
the Act prescribes statutes of limitation and repose.136
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW IN DESIGN
AND WARNING CASES
In 1974, South Carolina adopted section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts and the accompanying comments
as the interpretative basis for strict liability. 37 Because the
drafters of section 402A focused primarily on mismanufacture or
construction defects in products'38 and were particularly con-
cerned with the relationship between manufacturers and con-
sumers, design and warning cases have caused the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court substantial difficulty.139
Successful analysis of design and warning cases requires
constant awareness of the basic elements of proof. In any tort
131. Id. § 108(C), at 62,730.
132. Id. § 116, at 62,742-43. See generally, Ribstein, Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act: An Analysis of Arbitration Claims Under Section 116, 46 J. Am L. 359 (1981).
133. U.P.L.A. § 118, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,746.
134. Id. § 119, at 62,747.
135. Id. § 120, at 62,748.
136. Id. § 110, at 62,732. See generally, Ribstein, The Counter Attack to Retake the
Citadel Continues: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Prod-
ucts Liability, 46 J. Am L. 449 (1981).
137. For the text of section 402A, see footnote 11 supra. Section 402A is now codi-
fied at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
138. U.P.L.A. § 104, analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
139. South Carolina has had a long-arm statute in effect for several years. S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-2-802, -803 (1976). The requirement of privity was eliminated by S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976), and with respect to corporations, the court has made clear its
intention to "still any whisper" of privity in South Carolina. JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 274
S.C. 413, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980). The result is that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
strict liability theory and the Uniform Commercial Code warranty theories are in full
force with one exception. The court hesitated to decide whether the enactment of section
402A was retroactive. Recently, however, the court has determined that section 402A is
not retroactive. Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises, Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
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action, a plaintiff must prove a breach of some duty and that the
breach of duty was the proximate or reasonably foreseeable
cause of some injury.1 0 When examining any of the facts that
have been suggested by courts or commentators, a determination
of whether the particular fact is relevant to the issue of breach
of duty or to the issue of proximate cause is critical. Relevance
only to the question of liability is not sufficient. Because liability
comprises both breach of duty and proximate cause, a fact rele-
vant to one may not be relevant to the other; therefore, no single
fact can respond with final authority to both issues.
The concept of foreseeability has probably caused more dif-
ficulty in this area than any other concept. Although it is fre-
quently argued that foreseeability should be the final test of lia-
bility, this argument raises a question of whether a duty exists
to guard against everything that is foreseeable when, in fact,
every event is foreseeable. One who wishes to permit recovery
may say with the benefit of hindsight that a certain injury was
foreseeable and that the failure to design a warning or device to
guard against it creates liability. One who wishes to limit recov-
ery may argue that there is no duty to design warnings or de-
vices for known dangers and no duty to protect another from his
own carelessness. These positions offer no help in determining
the standard of responsibility to be placed on manufacturers.
Whether or not a manufacturer has an obligation to provide
a particular design or warning must be established in terms of
whether, as a matter of policy, the law wishes to impose such a
duty. Once a duty has been established, the analysis must shift
to determine whether the breach of duty resulted in an injury
that was reasonably foreseeable; that is, whether or not the
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury. This dif-
ference was very clearly discerned in a leading case141 cited by
the drafters of the U.P.L.A. in which the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals said:
Foreseeability alone, however, creates no duty. If such were the
case, a manufacturer of hammers, foreseeing injured fingers
and thumbs, would be liable for every such injury. Thus, duty
is established as a matter of social policy-as a means to an
140. E.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at 324-27.
141. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
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end.142
Defect is defined as a failure to design a safety device or
warning that renders a product "unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property."14 To determine whether a
product is defective, the inquiry should focus on both the nature
of the product and the conduct of the manufacturer. To deter-
mine whether a particular condition of a product is the proxi-
mate cause of some injury, on the other hand, inquiry should
focus on the environment in which the product is used, the con-
duct of the injured party, and the conduct of other persons who
may have caused or contributed to the injury.
In design and warning cases, the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
U.P.L.A., apparently continues to apply a fault standard. The
court has considered the concepts of breach of duty and proxi-
mate cause in four significant recent decisions: Marchant v.
Mitchell Distributing Co. (Marchant I),144 Marchant v. Lorain
Division of Koehring (Marchant II),145 Young v. Tide Craft,
Inc.,"'46 and Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co.'
47
In Marchant I and Marchant II, a cement plant employee
injured in a crane accident sued Mitchell Distributing Company,
the seller of an allegedly defective crane, and Koehring, the
crane's manufacturer. Plaintiff's injury resulted from a phenom-
enon known as "double-blocking", which occurs when the ex-
tendable boom of a crane is extended beyond the length of
"played out" cable, causing the cable to snap. Koehring manu-
factured cranes with safety devices to prevent "double-block-
ing", and cranes with this device were displayed by Mitchell.
Plaintiff's employer, after purchasing a crane without the op-
tional safety device, permitted operation of the crane by an em-
ployee who had not been trained to operate it and had never
operated it, despite the fact that Mitchell had trained five other
142. Id. at 1070 n.9 (quoting Recent Decision, 42 NoTRE D!mE LAW. 111, 115
(1966)).
143. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 679 (1978) (quot-
ing Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147, 560 P.2d 934, 939 (1977)).
144. 270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977).
145. 272 S.C. 243, 251 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
146. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
147. 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).
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employees in the crane's operation. Furthermore, the plaintiff
and a co-worker were instructed to get into a bucket that was
not designed for personnel and had no manual override
switch.14
In Marchant I, the supreme court affirmed a summary judg-
ment in favor of the crane distributor.14 9 The decision seemed to
say that the crane was not defective as a matter of law and
thereby offered some clarification of the meaning of defect in the
context of design and warning cases. The fact that the risk was
observable by anyone and was specifically known by the crane's
operator was considered in determining whether the retail seller
had a duty to guard against a known risk.150 The specific result
that a seller of a crane is not under a legal duty to provide a
safety device against a known risk was a step toward defining
the scope of the seller's duty, even though the decision was lim-
ited to a particular device for a particular risk of an extendable
boom crane. In Marchant II, however, when the same issue was
raised with respect to the manufacturer of the crane rather than
its seller, the supreme court reversed a summary judgment in
favor of the manufacturer,1 5 and progress in discerning the
meaning of defectiveness evaporated.
Perhaps the most helpful South Carolina decision to date is
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 1 2 in which a boatowner was fatally
injured after he and a repairman decided to splice the boat's
broken steering cable, knowing that this was a highly dangerous
practice. When the owner then used the boat, the spliced cable
separated, the boat jerked into a turn, and the owner was
thrown from the boat and drowned. In a manner that is very
difficult to reconcile with any conceivable jury instruction, the
jury absolved the boat dealer and the repairman, but returned a
verdict against the manufacturer. The supreme court rejected
the plaintiff's contention that lack of a kill switch supported the
jury verdict against the manufacturer and held that the absence
of the device did not constitute a defect. 53 In a decision that is
148. 270 S.C. at 33-34, 240 S.E.2d at 512.
149. Id. at 33, 240 S.E.2d at 512.
150. Id. at 37, 240 S.E.2d at 514.
151. 272 S.C. at 245, 251 S.E.2d at 190.
152. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
153. Id. at 458, 242 S.E.2d at 673.
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particularly useful in outlining the distinction between breach of
duty and proximate cause, the court in Young, as in Marchant I,
relied on the test that the failure to install a safety device con-
stitutes a defect if the product, absent such feature or device, is
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty.1 54 Although Young is not particularly helpful in determin-
ing the meaning of defect beyond this broad statement of the
test, the court's extended discussion of foreseeability illuminates
the basis of liability in South Carolina with respect to the proxi-
mate cause component. The court makes it clear that foresee-
ability is the test not of defectiveness but of proximate cause.
155
The court looked from the vantage point of the manufacturer
under an objective test to determine whether the absence of a
kill switch rendered the boat defective156 and employed a subjec-
tive test to determine whether the absence of any warning was a
proximate cause of the accident. 157 The court then found as a
matter of law that, under an objective test of common
knowledge, the boat was not defective 58 and further found that,
because the owner's subjective knowledge was such that he had
encountered the risk knowingly, the absence of a kill switch was
not the proximate cause of the accident.
1 59
In Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co.,1' 0 a fifteen year
old boy was injured three days after beginning his first job. The
injury occurred while the boy was standing on a catwalk at-
tempting to dislodge ice jammed in his employer's ice storage
bins. Defendant Custom Ice Equipment Company had designed
and installed the ice-making equipment, but the employer had
constructed the catwalk that enabled employees to reach into
the storage bins. The plaintiff alleged that the absence of a pro-
tective shield over the conveyor rendered it defective and intro-
duced evidence that ice-jamming was a common problem and
154. Id. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 679.
155. Id. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
156. Id. at 470-71, 242 S.E.2d at 680. The court applied the consumer expectation
test expressed in comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 402A and stated
that "[it is common knowledge that a normal risk of boating is that of being thrown
overboard... . [The test set out is an objective one and... must be attributed to
Young... ." Id. at 470-71, 242 S.E.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
158. Id. at 472, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
159. Id. at 466, 242 S.E.2d at 677.
160. 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).
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that the defendant manufacturer knew that ice plant employees
commonly reached into storage bins to dislodge blockages. The
supreme court held that these facts were susceptible of the in-
ference that the product was defective or unreasonably danger-
ous, and it was then proper to submit the question of proximate
cause to the jury.161 The court pointed out that it was known by
manufacturers of ice-making equipment that ice blockages occur
and must be physically dislodged and, furthermore, that this
manufacturer knew "that it was a common practice in other ice
plants to reach into ice storage bins with a garden hoe to dis-
lodge the frozen ice. '162 The decision in Kennedy appears to ap-
ply to the manufacturer an objective test of defectiveness based
on the manufacturer's knowledge of common practice in the in-
dustry, adequate proof of which would establish a breach of
duty. The subjective test of proximate cause was met because
the jury was free to determine that a fifteen year old boy begin-
ning his first job would not have been aware of the risk with
which plaintiff had been confronted and would not have engaged
in conduct that contributed to his own injury.163
The objective standard of a reasonable person's knowledge
addresses the question of whether a product is defective. When
the nature of the product is viewed from the position of a rea-
sonable manufacturer and a reasonable consumer, considering
the particular market, an objective focus on whether or not the
manufacturer has breached a duty to design and warn against
danger is possible. Subjective analysis of an injured party's
knowledge addresses not the character of the product but the
question of whether the design defect was the proximate cause
of the accident or whether in fact the plaintiff's knowing con-
duct was either an independent proximate cause or an interven-
ing or contributing cause of the accident.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, emphasizing the risk-
benefit concept, has also held that the inquiry into whether or
not a product is defective necessarily requires analysis of the
feasibility from both an economic and functional standpoint of
modifying a product's design.1 6 4 This risk-benefit test is quite
161. Id. at 173, 246 S.E.2d at 177.
162. Id. at 175, 246 S.E.2d at 178.
163. Id. at 176, 246 S.E.2d at 178.
164. Sanders v. Western Auto Supply Co., 256 S.C. 490, 495, 183 S.E.2d 321, 324
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similar to the five-element tests incorporated in section 104 of
the U.P.L.A. 165
Perhaps the greatest significance of recent South Carolina
decisions lies in the distinction the supreme court has drawn be-
tween product sellers and product manufacturers. These deci-
sions have brought South Carolina closer than many jurisdic-
tions to the related provisions of the U.P.L.A. The U.P.L.A. does
not impose liability on a seller unless the seller is directly at
fault' 6 or the manufacturer is unavailable to the claimant. 67 In
Marchant I, the South Carolina Supreme Court held as a matter
of law that the seller of the crane could not be held liable be-
cause of the absence of a safety device referred to as an an-
tiblocking device and specifically stated, "Our opinion deals
solely with the action against Mitchell [the seller]. The claim
against Lorain Division of Koehring [the manufacturer] is not
here involved."'6 8 In Marchant II, the court pointed out that
"[c]ritical to our decision in [Marchant I] was the fact that the
distributor of the crane was not responsible for its design or as-
sembly"' 6 9 and reached a different result on the same facts by
denying summary judgment to the manufacturer.1 70 Because the
manufacturer rather than the seller is responsible for design,
South Carolina law recognizes a difference between the posture
of a manufacturer and that of a seller in design and warning
cases, as does the U.P.L.A., and places accountability with
responsibility.
South Carolina has not adopted comparative responsibility
or apportionment of damages171 and has made no provision for
contribution or implied indemnity among joint tortfeasors.172 In
(1971). Accord, Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
165. See notes 115 & 117 supra. See also text accompanying notes 32-35.
166. U.P.L.A. §§ 105(A), (B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,726.
167. Id. § 105(C), at 62,726.
168. 270 S.C. at 32, 240 S.E.2d at 511.
169. 272 S.C. at 246, 251 S.E.2d at 191.
170. Id. at 245, 251 S.E.2d at 190.
171. Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 606 (1978). See Phillips, The Case
for Judicial Adoption of Comparative Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C.L. REv. 295
(1980).
172. Adcox v. American Home Assurance Co., 258 S.C. 331, 337, 188 S.E.2d 785, 788
(1972); Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963). The
lengthy dissent by Justice Brailsford in Whetstone, for example, contended that al-
though the majority recognized exceptions to the rule denying indemnity between joint
tortfeasors, the court had, in effect, dismissed the plaintiff's claim without a trial. 243
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South Carolina, a third party defendant manufacturer may en-
force a limited contribution or indemnification against a culpa-
ble employer 7 3 and may assert an employer's contributory negli-
gence as a defense when the employer claims a right to
subrogation.
17 4
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the problem of overlap between products liability and
workmen's compensation, although the records in Marchant I &
II clearly illustrate virtually all of the problems that potentially
exist. In those cases, the employer had total control over the cir-
cumstances under which the accident took place: the employer
purchased the crane without an antiblocking device and directed
an untrained employee to operate the crane with personnel rid-
ing in a bucket not designed for that purpose.17 5 Neither the dis-
tributor nor the manufacturer had any control over these cir-
cumstances, and the plaintiff probably had no realistic choice
about engaging in the dangerous activity. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff received serious injuries for which workmen's compen-
sation benefits may have been inadequate. On the other hand,
funds available to the plaintiff from collateral sources would not
have been admissible for jury consideration and would not have
been offset against a verdict. 6
As a matter of law, the plaintiff was not permitted to re-
cover against the distributor but was granted the right to a jury
trial against the manufacturer.17 7 Because the parties reached a
settlement, it is not known how a jury would have reacted to
these facts. Potentially, a jury might have shifted the plaintiff's
loss to the manufacturer despite any funds the plaintiff received
from collateral sources. Furthermore, the employer may have
had its workmen's compensation benefits reimbursed out of any
S.C. at 71, 132 S.E.2d at 177 (Brailsford, J., dissenting)(quoting Builders Supply Co. v.
McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 327-28, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951)).
173. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 42-1-580 (1976); Bums v. Carolina Power & Light, 88 F.
Supp. 769, 774 (E.D.S.C. 1950).
174. American Cas. Co. v. South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F. Supp. 30, 32 (W.D.S.C.
1954); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Odom, 237 S.C. 167, 176, 177, 116 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1960).
175. 270 S.C. at 33-34, 240 S.E.2d at 512.
176. See, e.g., New Foundation Baptist Church v. Davis, 257 S.C. 443, 446, 186
S.E.2d 247, 249 (1972). See also U.P.L.A. § 119, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,747, which provides
that "the claimant's recovery ... shall be reduced by any compensation from a public
source which claimant has received. . . ." Id.
177. 270 S.C. at 33, 240 S.E.2d at 512; 272 S.C. at 245, 251 S.E.2d at 190.
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recovery or settlement the plaintiff received. Meanwhile, the em-
ployer had every right to continue to use the crane in the same
manner without modification.
South Carolina law as illustrated in Marchant I & II fails to
accomplish the goals of either the tort system or the workmen's
compensation system when the two overlap in design and warn-
ing cases. The burden is frequently not placed on the party best
able to prevent the accident, and accident prevention is the only
result that will accomplish all the goals of both systems.
Thus far, South Carolina has not accepted any of the gen-
eral products liability reforms that are incorporated in the
U.P.L.A. The supreme court neither screens nonpecuniary dam-
ages1"78 nor determines the amount of punitive damages.179 The
collateral source rule is applied very strictly,180 and statutes of
limitation and repose are very open.1 81 South Carolina does not
have any absolute bars to recovery based on governmental stan-
dards prescribed by statute, regulation, or mandatory contract
specifications but does consider these circumstances when deter-
mining liability.182
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE OVERLAP BETWEEN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The problems and shortcomings caused by overlap between
products liability and workmen's compensation have prompted a
number of tentative solutions. As long as workmen's compensa-
tion remains a nonexclusive remedy, proposed reforms will focus
on the allocation of economic loss resulting from employee inju-
ries between employers and third party manufacturers of prod-
178. U.P.L.A. § 120, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,748.
179. Id. § 119, at 62,747.
180. See id. § 119, at 62,747 ("[T]he claimant's recovery ... shall be reduced by
any compensation from a public source which claimant has received.... ."). See, e.g.,
New Foundation Baptist Church v. Davis, 257 S.C. 443, 446, 186 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1972).
181. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (1976), which provides inter alia, for a six-
year statute of limitations for actions upon a contract, liability created by statute, and
actions for personal injury. See U.P.L.A. § 110(B), (C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,731.
182. In South Carolina, the applicability in a products liability context of the stan-
dard set in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-15-10 to -520
(1976 & Supp. 1980) remains unclear. The supreme court, in Kennedy v. Custom Ice
Equipment Co., declined to rule for procedural reasons on the exceptions raised to the
applicability of the Act and its standard. 271 S.C. at 177, 246 S.E.2d at 178-79. See also
U.P.L.A. § 108, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,730.
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ucts used in the workplace. One proposal promotes the tort goal
of deterring wrongdoing183 by permitting a product manufac-
turer the right to seek full indemnification against an em-
ployer.18 ' This proposal, however, is inconsistent with the legis-
lative theory underlying workmen's compensation legislation:
the employer provides a guaranteed recovery in exchange for a
limit on the amount of recovery.
Some states that follow a less stringent version of the same
proposal permit product manufacturers to seek indemnification
against employers, but the right of indemnification may not ex-
ceed the amount for which an employer may be held liable to an
employee under the statutory workmen's compensation sys-
tem.185 Although this scheme gives a manufacturer some relief
when an employer is at fault, it is a weak deterrent for the
employer.
A few states deny product manufacturers the right to seek
indemnity against employers but also deny employers any pro-
ceeds of employees' tort suits against product manufacturers.188
Although this scheme has the advantage of reducing the amount
of litigation between manufacturers and employers, it does not
provide a deterrent to employers' wrongdoing and may also re-
sult in windfalls to claimants. Furthermore, it may result in in-
equitable recovery by injured workers, some of whom can re-
cover only in the compensation system, while others may recover
in both the compensation and tort systems.
Other possibilities have been suggested but have not yet
been adopted. At least one commentator has called for a deter-
mination by the United States Supreme Court that equal pro-
tection requires comparative negligence in a multiple-party suit
if a state has adopted comparative, negligence in two-party
suits.1 87 Alternatively, Congress might resolve the conflict in a
183. Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 389 (1972)(quoting Werner, Contribution and Indemnity, 57 CAL. L. REV.
490, 516 (1969)).
184. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 391-92.
185. Soule, Toward An Equitable and Rational Allocation of Employee Injury
Losses in Cases With Third Party Liability, 46 INs. CouNsEL J. 201, 208 (1979).
186. Id. at 211.
187. Davis, Third Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation-Covered Em-
ployers are Negligent-Where Did Dole & Sunspan Lead?, 4 HoPSTRA L. REv. 571, 577
(1976). See Phillips, supra note 35.
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legislative package of workmen's compensation reform."8 State
legislative or judicial creation of benefit equality in the products
liability and workmen's compensation systems offers yet another
option.18 9 Finally, courts and legislatures might adopt compara-
tive negligence theories and apply them between the two sys-
tems, apportioning recoveries between the two systems by apply-
ing the degree of fault in each system to that system's benefit
levels.1
90
Overemphasis of loss distribution and underemphasis of loss
prevention are the major weaknesses of the systems that are
presently being used. Wide loss distribution does not recapture a
loss but only shifts it. Perhaps what is becoming apparent in
other areas of social policy will be recognized with respect to in-
dustrial accidents: there is a limit to the amount of social engi-
neering that is economically affordable. Once a net loss has oc-
curred, it may be shifted in any desired direction. Nevertheless,
there is no guarantee that the loss can be distributed success-
fully, and someone may have to sustain an unbearable burden.
This burden may fall upon an injured employee, the employees
of a business forced to slow down or cease operations, an em-
ployer, or consumers of the employer's product. An entire geo-
graphic area may be affected as in the case of the Wisconsin
granite works. 91
The only equivalent of loss recapture is prevention of loss in
the first place. Although a large recovery may be financially re-
warding, injured workers would presumably prefer to avoid in-
jury, and incentives must be structured to encourage a safer
workplace and safer work practices. Prevention of workplace in-
juries would meet every goal of both the tort and the workmen's
compensation, systems-workers would remain whole, they
would not burden society, inequitable distribution would be
avoided, transaction costs including attorney's fees would be
eliminated, and the judicial system would be unburdened.
Nevertheless, provision must be made for those losses that
inevitably occur under any system. The drafters of the U.P.L.A.
would prefer reform of workmen's compensation benefits to ex-
188. Davis, supra note 187, at 578.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 579.
191. A. LARSON, supra note 75, § 2.70 at 14 n.18.
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clusion of any other action by employees.1 9 2 Upgraded work-
men's compensation benefits would become the exclusive rem-
edy for any industrial accident. Unfortunately, because the
drafters concluded that alterations of workmen's compensation
law would be inappropriate in a model products liability law,
they proposed what they considered to be the next best solu-
tion:193 reduction of any products liability award to an employee
by the present value of any amount paid or to be paid as work-
men's compensation benefits for the same injury. 1 4 The pro-
posed solution also abolishes the employer's rights of subroga-
tion, contribution, or indemnity against the product seller.195
VII. CONCLUSION
The need for independent reform both in the workmen's
compensation system and the tort system is implicit in the
struggle of the courts and the writings of various scholars. The
willingness of the courts to allow tort law to be stretched beyond
its limits into an absolute liability or social insurance status in-
dicates a desire for a more adequate and certain recovery in
workplace accidents than is presently provided under the work-
men's compensation system. Court decisions and legislative ef-
forts in the areas of exceptions to exclusive remedy, contribution
and indemnity by employers to third parties, comparative negli-
gence, limits on awards for pain and suffering, limits on punitive
damages, and statutory penalties on employers for particularly
egregious conduct all indicate a recognition of the need to im-
pose loss shifting in some pattern consistent with fault and a
need to control both recovery and costs in the tort system.
Perhaps the best overall solution to the problem-an im-
proved workmen's compensation system as the sole source of re-
covery in product-related workplace accidents-was abandoned
by the drafters of the U.P.L.A. Comprehensive reform of the
workmen's compensation system is needed, and, with respect to
nonwork-related injuries, courts and legislatures should continue
to consider and adopt the specific provisions of the U.P.L.A.
These proposals would eliminate the overlap between the work-
192. U.P.L.A. § 114, analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,740-41.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 114, at 62,740.
195. Id.
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men's compensation system and the tort recovery system and
would resolve many of the problems resulting from the present
overlap.
The rigidity imposed by a statutory scheme, when con-
trasted with the flexibility of the common law, is a potential
source of trouble. The law can more easily resume a proper
course after a single bad decision than after the adoption of an
ill-considered statutory scheme. We have been reminded that
"the ability of the law of torts to respond to individual fact situ-
ations, to sense injustice, and balance the needs of society
against the compensatory demands of the plaintiff is a value not
easily dismissed. '"19 Had a statutory workmen's compensation
system never been implemented, the common law might well
have eliminated the restrictive recovery elements of tort law that
led to the enactment of workmen's compensation legislation.
The evolution of the tort recovery system in the area of
products liability merits careful review. The explosion of prod-
ucts liability in the 1960s accompanied a number of other social
policy expansions during that decade. These innovations were
based to a great extent on consideration of desired results rather
than on judgments about what society could afford. Individuals
were seen as victims rather than as causes of events, and the
idea that risk and responsibility should be spread throughout so-
ciety was seductive. Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that
greater emphasis on accountability for one's actions engenders
more responsible action, and, in the area of products liability,
more emphasis must be allocated to loss prevention than to loss-
shifting.
Professor Seavey has identified two significant interests that
tort law attempts to balance:
In determining whether there is tort liability when harm has
been caused, the focal point of conflict has been whether one
should be liable for harm irrespective of fault. The law has
been in a state of flux in its desire to protect the two basic
interests of individuals - the interest in security and the in-
terest in freedom of action. The protection of the first requires
that a person who has been harmed as a result of the activity
of another should be compensated by the other irrespective of
his fault; the protection of the second requires that a person
196. Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 70, at 256.
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who harms another should be required to compensate the other
only when his activity was intentionally wrongful or indicated
an undue lack of consideration for the interests of others. At
any given time and place, the law is the resultant derived from
the competition between these two basic concepts.197
Freedom and security must balance; too much of either destroys
the other. In recent years, the law has emphasized the interest
individuals have in security, but perhaps the time has come for
greater emphasis on freedom of action.
197. Seavey, Principles of Tort Law, 56 HARV. L. REv. 72, 73 (1942), reprinted in
LANDMARKS OF THE LAW, 377, 378 (Henson ed. 1960).
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